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Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism,
and the Asymmetry Claim*
Louise Hanson
Many people accept, at least implicitly, what I call the asymmetry claim: the view
that moral realism is more defensible than aesthetic realism. This article chal-
lenges the asymmetry claim. I argue that it is surprisingly hard to find points of
contrast between the two domains that could justify their very different treatment
with respect to realism. I consider five potentially promising ways to do this, and
I argue that all of them fail. If I am right, those who accept the asymmetry claim
have a significant burden of proof.
I. INTRODUCTION
A growing number of philosophers are sympathetic to moral realism
(sometimes called robust moral realism). This is the view, roughly, that
there are moral facts, and these facts are robustly mind-independent, in
the sense that they are not constituted by people’s attitudes, say, of ap-
proval and disapproval, nor are they constituted by the attitudes of hypo-
thetical ideal observers. The wrongness of slavery, for example, according
to moral realism, does not consist in the fact that anybody disapproves
of it, nor does it consist in the fact that maximally rational, well-informed
observers would disapprove of it. According to moral realism, actual and
ideal observers alike play the role, at best, of trackers of moral facts, not
determiners of them. So slavery would be wrong even if actual people ap-
proved of it, and even if ideal observers (specified in nonmoral terms) ap-
proved of it.
* I would like to thank Chris Cowie, Guy Fletcher, and Bob Stecker for helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to audiences at the University of Leeds in
2014, the Humane Philosophy and the Arts Conference in Oxford in 2014, and the Real-
ism and Antirealism in Metaethics and Aesthetics Conference in Cambridge in 2014, as
well as to two anonymous referees and various associate editors at Ethics.
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While realism is an increasingly popular position in metaethics,1
most people are less sympathetic to its counterpart in aesthetics. At first
blush, itmight look as though this is false:many aestheticians, after all, de-
scribe themselves as aesthetic realists.2 But when they do so, they are us-
ing the term ‘realism’ differently from how I am using it here, and differ-
ently from how many in metaethics use the term.3
As I amunderstanding ‘realism’here, aesthetic realism would be the
view that there are aesthetic facts and that these facts are robustly mind-
independent, in the sense that they are not constituted by people’s atti-
tudes, say, of admiration or pleasure, nor are they constituted by the atti-
tudes of hypothetical ideal observers. According to aesthetic realism, the
beauty of Venice doesn’t consist in our admiration of it, or in the pleasure
it gives us; nor, further, does it consist in the fact that hypothetical ideal
observers would admire or take pleasure in it. According to aesthetic re-
alism, actual and ideal observers alike play the role, at best, of trackers of
aesthetic facts, not determiners of them. So Venice would be beautiful
even if nobody enjoyed or admired it, and even if ideal observers (spec-
ified in nonaesthetic terms) would not enjoy or admire it. Aesthetic real-
ism, in contrast with its metaethical counterpart, has few, if any, support-
ers, and in fact it is considered to be such a nonstarter that any expression
of support for it is likely to meet with what David Lewis called the incred-
ulous stare.4
This is a striking disparity. For it to be justified, there would need to
be some difference between beauty andmorality that renders the former
less susceptible to realist treatment. Call the view that aesthetic realism is
less defensible thanmoral realism the “asymmetry claim.”The asymmetry
1. See, e.g., Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003); David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011);
WilliamFitzPatrick, “RobustEthicalRealism,Non-naturalism, andNormativity,” inOxfordStud-
ies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3:159–205;
Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); Matthew Kra-
mer,Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
2. See, e.g., Jerrold Levinson, “Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative Force, and Differences
of Sensibility,” inContemplating Art (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 2006), 315–35;Marcia Ea-
ton, Merit: Ethical and Aesthetic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); María José Alcaraz
León, “The Rational Justification of Aesthetic Judgments,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Crit-
icism 66 (2008): 291–300; Philip Pettit, “The Possibility of Aesthetic Realism,” in Pleasure,
Preference and Value, ed. E. Schaper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 17–39.
3. According to the usage of ‘realism’ common in aesthetics, response-dependence
accounts are classified as realist. Accounts that take beauty to be a matter of the responses
actual agents in fact have, the responses they would have under ideal conditions, or the re-
sponses hypothetical ideal observers would have all count as realist under the definition fa-
vored in aesthetics. But none of these kinds of accounts take beauty to bemind-independent
in the robust sense I am discussing here, and so none of them count as realist in the sense
relevant to this article.
4. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 133.
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claim has not before been challenged. And despite, or perhaps because
of, its widespread acceptance, it has rarely been explicitly defended. Here
it is subjected to detailed scrutiny. I show that it is significantly harder to
justify than has been appreciated. I discuss five ways to argue for the asym-
metry claim. These are arguments that score relatively highly on one or
both of the following desiderata: match with actual motivation (they are
arguments made in the literature or that otherwise plausibly capture rea-
sons why people have found the asymmetry claim attractive), and chance
of success (they are arguments that look potentially promising). All five
arguments take the form of identifying some apparent point of contrast
between the moral and the aesthetic and arguing that it entails that aes-
thetic realism is vulnerable to anobstacle thatmoral realismdoes not face.
I argue that each of these arguments fails.
While this does not conclusively refute the asymmetry claim, it does
raise a serious challenge for those who are sympathetic to it. If I am right
that the differences traditionally appealed to aren’t up to the task, those
who accept the asymmetry claim can no longer simply take for granted
that it holds, but must provide some argument for thinking that it does.
If this challenge cannot be met, then certain very common combinations
of views might need to be reexamined. The vast majority of aestheticians
stop short of aesthetic realism; in the absence of any good arguments for
the asymmetry claim, they should also stop short of moral realism. Equally,
moral realists, if no compelling arguments for asymmetry are forthcom-
ing, should take aesthetic realism more seriously than they have.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Aesthetic Value
In aesthetics there are a number of different issues with respect to which
the question of realism arises.5 The comparison I’m interested in here is
between morality and beauty. The widespread tendency I have in mind,
then, is the tendency to think that realism about what is morally good and
5. To name a few: beauty, fictional truth, pictorial representation, musical expression
of emotion. These questions are largely independent: it is perfectly intelligible that some-
one could take one position with respect to fictional truth (say, relativism), for example,
and quite another with respect to beauty (say, realism). Further, many philosophers distin-
guish between beauty and artistic merit: a beautiful artwork is not necessarily a good one,
and a good artwork is not necessarily beautiful. See, e.g., Arthur Danto, “Works of Art and
Mere Real Things,” in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1981), 1–33; Robert Stecker, “Artistic Value Defended,” Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism 70 (2012): 355–62; Carolyn Korsmeyer, “On Distinguishing ‘Aesthetic’ from
‘Artistic,’” Journal of Aesthetic Education 11 (1977): 45–57. Depending on how beauty and
artistic merit are related, there may also be room for taking different meta-aesthetic stances
with respect to these two notions. See Louise Hanson, “Artistic Value Is Attributive Good-
ness,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 75 (2017): 415–27, esp. 422–24.
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bad is more defensible than realism about what is beautiful. In what fol-
lows I use the terms ‘aesthetic value’ and ‘beauty’ interchangeably. Some
philosophers include more than beauty under the category of aesthetic
value,6 but most at least take beauty to be an example of aesthetic value.
I will be adopting the narrower usage.
B. Realism
I introduced the relevant sense of realism in terms of a commitment to a
particularly robust form of mind independence. It is now time to set out
a full definition of realism. For the purpose of this article, realism, with
respect to a domain D, is defined as the following view:
R1: D-statements are in the business of stating facts.
R2: There really are such facts.
R3: These facts are (relevantly) robustly mind-independent, in the
sense that they are (relevantly7) independent of
(i) the actual attitudes of actual observers;
(ii) the attitudes actual observers would have under ideal condi-
tions; and
(iii) the attitudes ideal observers would have under ideal condi-
tions.8
6. James Shelley, “The Problem of Non-perceptual Art,” British Journal of Aesthetics 43
(2003): 363–78; Noël Carroll, “Non-perceptual Aesthetic Properties,” British Journal of Aes-
thetics 44 (2004): 413–23; Gary Iseminger, The Aesthetic Function of Art (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2004);DominicMcIverLopes, “TheMythof (Non-aesthetic)ArtisticValue,”
Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011): 518–36.
7. Most realists who include a mind-independence clause don’t want to deny all kinds
of dependence of normative facts on human attitudes. They will want to allow that the
wrongness of a sharp remark or an ill-judged joke can depend on the fact that it caused
someone to feel hurt or embarrassed. For discussion of this, see Shafer-Landau, Moral Re-
alism, 15; David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 15–16; Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, 4. See also Sec. III of the
present article for further discussion.
8. There is perhaps some scope for debate about whether Fitting Attitude accounts of
value can qualify as realist. Fitting Attitude accounts of moral goodness hold that it is nec-
essarily true that “an object S has a value V (e.g., moral goodness, beauty) if and only if it is
fitting to have a certain attitude (e.g., approval, admiration) toward S.” See Justin D’Arms
and Daniel Jacobson, “Sentiment and Value,” Ethics 110 (2000): 722–48; Graham Oddie,
Value, Reality and Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Mark Schroeder, “Value
and the Right Kind of Reason,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 5:25–55; Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, “Fitting-
ness First,” Ethics 126 (2016): 575–606.
Certainly reductive forms of FA, according to which something is morally good/beau-
tiful in virtue of the fact that certain attitudes toward it are fitting, will not qualify as
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This usage is common in metaethics,9 but it is virtually unheard of
in aesthetics. In aesthetics it is common to define realism in terms of just
R1 and R2, omitting any kind of mind-independence clause.10 And those
who do take some kind of mind independence to be criterial of aesthetic
realism tend to have in mind a less robust form of mind-independence
than that given in R3.11 Both kinds of approach classify at least some
response-dependence accounts as realist. Response-dependence accounts
of beauty hold that for something to be beautiful is for it to be disposed to
produce a certain kind of response in (actual or ideal) observers, under
certain conditions. These accounts don’t qualify as realist by R1–R3, since
they don’t take facts about beauty to be robustly mind independent. They
take facts about beauty to be constituted by facts about the actual or hypo-
thetical attitudes of actual or ideal observers, and this is exactly what R3
rules out.
Needless to say, no fruitful comparison of two domains with respect
to the tenability of realism can be conducted if the term ‘realism’ is un-
derstood in a more demanding sense when discussing one domain and a
less demanding sense when discussing the other. My interest here is in
whether realism in themore demanding sense is more defensible for eth-
ics than for aesthetics, so I shall be using the term ‘realism’ to refer to the
position given in R1–R3.
C. The Asymmetry Claim
Somephilosophers express support for theasymmetry claimexplicitly.Da-
vid Enoch asserts that “there is a sense in which taking morality seriously
seems appropriate, but taking aesthetics seriously does not.”12 Marcia Ea-
9. See Ronald Milo, “Contractarian Constructivism,” Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995):
181–204; Shafer-Landau,Moral Realism, 13–18; Oddie, Value, Reality and Desire; Enoch, Tak-
ing Morality Seriously; Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism; Matthew Evans and Nishi Shah, “Mental
Agency and Metaethics,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 7:80–109; Kramer, Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.
10. See Pettit, “Possibility of Aesthetic Realism”; Alcaraz León, “Rational Justification
of Aesthetic Judgments”; James Young, “Aesthetic Antirealism,” Southern Journal of Philoso-
phy 35 (1997): 119–34.
11. See Levinson, “Aesthetic Properties”; John Bender, “Sensitivity, Sensibility, and Aes-
thetic Realism,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59 (2001): 73–83; Eaton, Merit, 51–53;
Stephanie Ross, “Ideal Observer Theories in Aesthetics,” Philosophy Compass 6 (2011): 513–
22.
12. Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, 268.
realist. However, if all it means to adopt an FA account is to hold that the above bicondi-
tional is necessarily true, then FA looks compatible with realism, since you could accept the
biconditional and hold that the right-hand side holds in virtue of the left-hand side, not the
other way around. For a discussion of this point, see Graham Oddie, “Fitting Attitudes,
Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-
Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 11:74–101.
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ton argues that realism about beauty is untenable in a way in which real-
ism in other domains is not: “Scientific realists believe that there are states
of the world, and hence facts about the world and statements describ-
ing those states, that are true independently of whether anyone believes
them. . . . Theorists have described moral realism analogously. There are
moral truths or facts, and these truths or facts are independent of the ev-
idence for them. . . . An analogous interpretation of aesthetic realism
would require that there be aesthetic facts or truths independent of the
evidence for them. Such a strong interpretation has few adherents, for
the very meaning of aesthetic terms carries a subjective element.”13
But acceptance of the asymmetry claim is frequently more implicit.
First, moral antirealists often claim that their theories transfer unprob-
lematically to aesthetics (as do J. L. Mackie regarding his moral error the-
ory and A. J. Ayer about his moral noncognitivism), while moral realists
don’t tend to be quite so cavalier about their claims transferring straight-
forwardly to aesthetics.14 This tendency suggests that people are assuming
that aesthetic realism faces all the potential obstacles that moral realism
does, andmore besides: if moral realism is shown to face insurmountable
problems, then these problems would also block aesthetic realism; but if
moral realism turns out to be right, aesthetic realismmight still be false.
Second, as noted above, moral realism is a popular position and is
taken seriously by its opponents, while its aesthetic counterpart is neither
popular nor taken seriously. The orthodoxy in aesthetics appears to be
that a response-dependence account—coupled with some story about
how this is compatible with there being standards of correctness, or objec-
tivity in somemeaningful sense—is the closest to realism that one can rea-
sonably get with respect to beauty.15 Response-dependence approaches
not only are popular in aesthetics but also (at least to my knowledge) vir-
13. Eaton, Merit, 51–52.
14. See A. J. Ayer, “Critique of Ethics and Theology,” in Language, Truth and Logic,
2nd ed. (London: Victor Gollancz, 1948), 102–20; J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and
Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), 15.
15. For examples of such accounts, see Frank Sibley, “Objectivity and Aesthetics,” Sup-
plement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 42 (1968): 31–72, esp. 32–33; John McDow-
ell, “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World,” in Pleasure, Preference and
Value, ed. E. Schaper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–16; David Wig-
gins, “A Sensible Subjectivism?,” in Needs, Values, and Truth, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon,
1987), 185–211; Richard Miller, “Three Versions of Objectivity,” in Aesthetics and Ethics: Es-
says at the Intersection, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
26–58; Pettit, “Possibility of Aesthetic Realism”; and, at least on some readings, David
Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” in Essays, Moral, Political, Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller
(Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985). See, e.g., James Shelley, “Hume and the Nature of
Taste,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998): 29–38.
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tually exhaust the category of accounts that seek to accommodate stan-
dards of correctness with respect to aesthetic value.16 People rarely go fur-
ther, in other words, and say that beauty is an entirely mind-independent
matter in the sense articulated in R3. This is in striking contrast with the
landscape in metaethics.17
Are there any good reasons to be squeamish about aesthetic mind-
independence if one is not worried about moral mind-independence? In
what follows I discuss five potential reasons. In each case, we have an argu-
ment that some feature of the aesthetic (i) is a point of contrast with the
moral and (ii) strongly suggests that aesthetic value is mind-dependent.
Each argument, then, is an argument that aesthetic realism is implausible
in a way that moral realism is not:
Dependence: Beauty depends on sensuous properties, such as col-
ors and sounds, which are themselvesmind-dependent. Moral good-
ness, on the otherhand, does not depend onmind-dependent prop-
erties.18
Pleasure: Beauty depends constitutively on pleasure in a way that
is incompatible with realism, but this is not the case with moral
goodness.
Descriptions: You can make a moral judgment on the basis of an
accurate, nonmoral description. This is not the case for aesthetic
judgments—no amount of nonaesthetic, or nonevaluative, descrip-
tions of something will put you in a position to judge whether it is
beautiful.19
16. Shelley and Watkins might be an exception. See Michael Watkins and James Shel-
ley, “Response-Dependence about Aesthetic Value,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2012):
338–52. Eddy Zemach’s Real Beauty (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1997) might also be an exception, but, as others have remarked, it is not easy to tell whether
his preferred view is one that takes aesthetic value to be genuinely mind-independent. See
Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson, review of Real Beauty, by Eddy M. Zemach, Canadian Jour-
nal of Philosophy 29 (1999): 635–53.
17. The following all argue for moral mind-independence: Shafer-Landau, Moral Re-
alism; Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism; Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously; FitzPatrick, “Robust
Ethical Realism”; Kramer, Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.
18. For this argument, see W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 126–27; and Nick Zangwill, “Skin Deep or in the Eye of the Beholder: The
Metaphysics of Aesthetic and Sensory Properties,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
61 (2000): 595–618.
19. The claim that aesthetic judgments cannot be made on the basis of descriptions is
frequently made. See, e.g., Peter Strawson, “Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art,” in Free-
dom and Resentment, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Routledge, 2008), 196–207, esp. 204; Philip Pettit,
“Substantive Moral Theory,” in Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1–27, 9 n. 10.
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Acquaintance: To judge something beautiful, you need to see it
for yourself, but to judge somethingmorally good or bad, you don’t.20
Principles: One way to judge the moral status of the action is to
apply principles, but you can never come to a view on whether some-
thing is beautiful by applying principles.
I argue that none of these arguments succeed. In each case, either
the feature of the aesthetic that it identifies is not a genuine point of con-
trast with themoral, or it doesn’t in fact lend any support to the claim that
aesthetic value is mind-dependent.
III. DEPENDENCE
Dependence: Beauty depends on sensuous properties, such as col-
ors and sounds, which are themselvesmind-dependent. Moral good-
ness, on the otherhand, does not depend onmind-dependent prop-
erties.
The Dependence point has sometimes been taken to support the
asymmetry claim. The thought is that here we have an argument against
realism about beauty that lacks a moral analogue:
D1: Beauty depends on sensuous properties, such as colors and
sounds (premise).
D2: Beauty can only be mind-independent if colors and sounds
are mind-independent (from D1, transitivity of dependence).
D3: Colors and sounds are not mind-independent (premise).
20. The claim that the Acquaintance Principle holds in aesthetics has a long history. See
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, ed. Nicholas Walker, trans. James Creed Meredith (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2009), sec. 8. Those who explicitly draw a contrast along these
lines with ethics include Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects (New York: Harper & Row,
1971), 233; Pettit, “Substantive Moral Theory,” 9; Miller, “Three Versions of Objectivity,”
35; Pettit, “Possibility of Aesthetic Realism,” esp. 25.
This claim is used by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge in a rare explicit argument for
the asymmetry claim. See SeanMcKeever andMichael Ridge, “Aesthetics and Particularism,”
in New Waves in Metaethics, ed. M. Brady (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 264–85.
McKeever and Ridge are not alone, however, in suggesting that the Acquaintance Princi-
ple’s holding in aesthetics supports aesthetic antirealism: Cain Todd argues that “no advo-
cate of the Acquaintance Principle ought to hold that aesthetic judgments are beliefs or
genuine assertions at all.”Cain Samuel Todd, “Quasi-realism, Acquaintance, and theNorms
of Aesthetic Judgement,” British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (2004): 277–96, 290. And Roger
Scruton argues that “in aesthetics you have to see for yourself precisely because what you have
to ‘see’ is not a property.” Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination (London: Methuen, 1974), 54
(emphasis mine).
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D4: So beauty can’t be mind-independent (from D2, D3).
D5: So aesthetic realism is false (from D4, definition of aesthetic
realism).
I will not take issue here with D3. It is beyond the scope of this article
to enter into the debate on the mind-dependence or otherwise of colors
and sounds, so I will assume for argument’s sake that D3 is correct. I shall
have more to say on D1 later, but for now, note that D1 should not be al-
lowed to stand without further argument. Many people hold that things
can be appropriately judged beautiful which lack sensuous properties en-
tirely. Proofs, chess moves, and theories are often held to be capable of
being beautiful.21 But even setting aside these worries, the argument is
unconvincing as an argument for the asymmetry claim.
The problem is the move fromD4 to D5 and the availability of a par-
allel argument againstmoral realism. As noted in Section II, it’s notmind-
dependence per se that’s at issue in the debate betweenmoral realists and
antirealists, but only a certain kind of mind-dependence. It’s widely ac-
knowledged, even bymoral realists, that moral goodness and badness can
depend on mind-dependent things in the following kinds of ways. If I
make a remark that upsets you, your upsetness looks like it bears on the
moral status of my act. If, in addition, I believe that you’ll be upset, and
I make the remark anyway—or if I actually intend to upset you in making
the remark—these features (my beliefs and intentions, your hurt feel-
ings) all look highly relevant to the moral status of my action. Given this,
an analogous argument can be constructed for the moral case:
D1m: Moral goodness and badness depend on intentions, hurt
feelings, and beliefs (premise).
D2m: Moral goodness and badness can only be mind-independent
if intentions, hurt feelings, and beliefs are mind-independent (from
D1m, transitivity of dependence).
D3m: Intentions, hurt feelings, andbeliefs arenotmind-independent
(premise).
D4m: So moral goodness and badness can’t be mind-independent
(from D2m, D3m).
D5m: Somoral realismis false(fromD4m,definitionofmoral realism).
21. Further, it’s not clear, even for things that have sensuous properties, that they can
never be beautiful by virtue of qualities other than those sensuous properties. If one holds,
for example, that not only a novel but also a copy of a novel can be beautiful by virtue of
features such as its plot progression and the nuance of its use of language, then this would
be a case of nonsensuously dependent beauty.
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There are two upshots of this for the argument from Dependence.
First, the moral case looks to be in the same boat as the aesthetic case with
respect to theDependence point, so they stand or fall together: ifDepen-
dence shows aesthetic realism to be implausible, its counterpart would
show moral realism to be implausible. So the argument fromDependence
would be useless as an argument for the asymmetry claim even if D1–D5
succeeded as an argument against aesthetic realism.
A second upshot is that the parallel with themoral case shouldmake
us doubtful that D1–D5 do succeed as an argument against aesthetic re-
alism. If moral realism doesn’t commit tomind independence per se, but
rather only to a specific kind ofmind-independence, thenD5 doesn’t fol-
low from D4. And if D5 doesn’t follow from D4 in the moral case, it
shouldn’t follow in the aesthetic case either. In other words, if mind-
dependence per se isn’t enough to preclude realism in the moral case, it
shouldn’t be enough to preclude realism in the aesthetic case.
Can theDependence argument be amended to target themore spe-
cific kind ofmind-independence that is criterial of realism? This is doubt-
ful. Call the kind of mind-dependence realists are concerned to deny the
bad kind of mind-dependence, and call the kind of mind-dependence
they are not concerned to deny the okay kind of mind-dependence. A ca-
nonical example of the bad kind would be “kicking puppies is wrong,
and what makes it wrong is that people would disapprove of it,” and a ca-
nonical example of the okay kind would be “my sharp remark to you was
wrong, and what makes it wrong is that it hurt your feelings.” Some have
rested content with there being an intuitive distinction here. But others
havetriedtopinpointwhatprincipleunderlies thedistinction.Philosophers
have, variously, taken the bad kind of mind-dependence to be stance-
dependence (Milo, Shafer-Landau),22 dependence of the moral truths on
our evidence for them (Brink, Sturgeon),23 and dependence on mental
or mind-dependent properties that is not a simple consequence of their
being normatively relevant (Enoch).24
What the asymmetry theorist needs is an argument that (i) shows that
beauty is mind-independent in the bad way and (ii) lacks amoral counter-
part. But it’s far from clear that the dependence of beauty on colors and
sounds could be made into such an argument. Consider, for example,
Enoch’s normative relevance criterion. Colors and sounds look norma-
tively relevant to beauty, just as hurt feelings andnefarious intentions look
normatively relevant tomoral badness. And this normative relevance looks
to be what’s making D1 look plausible. In this case, the kind of mind-
22. See Milo, “Contractarian Constructivism,” 182; Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 15.
23. See Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, 15–17; Nicholas Sturgeon,
“What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism Is True?,” Southern Journal of Philos-
ophy 24 (1986): 115–41, 117.
24. See Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, 3–4.
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dependence that the argument from Dependence can get us is not the
bad kind but the okay kind.
At the very least, then, someone who wants to use the Dependence
point to argue for the asymmetry claim will need to argue for some way
of drawing the line between the bad kind and the okay kind of mind-
dependence, that has the following features: (i) classifies dependence on
feelings, beliefs, and intentions as mind-dependence of the okay kind;
and (ii) classifies dependence on colors and sounds as mind-dependence
of the bad kind. This looks like a tall order.
IV. PLEASURE
Pleasure: Beauty depends constitutively on pleasure in a way that
is incompatible with realism, but this is not the case with moral
goodness.
It is striking that not only does nearly everyone accept aesthetic anti-
realism but also there is one specific kind of aesthetic antirealism that is
extremelypopular.This is a response-dependence viewaccording towhich
what it is for something to be beautiful is for it to occasion pleasure in ob-
servers of a certain kind.25 Call this view hedonic response-dependence (HRD)
about beauty.
HRD about beauty comes in different varieties, depending on what
the relevant kind of pleasure is and how the relevant kind of observer is
characterized. Most aesthetic HRD theorists hold that there is some dis-
tinctively aesthetic kind of pleasure and that beauty is a disposition in ob-
jects to occasion that kind of pleasure in observers whomeet certain con-
ditions. According to this kind of view, what it is for Venice to be beautiful
is just for it to have the capacity to give rise to this distinctive kind of plea-
sure in observers who meet certain requirements and who are observing
theobject undernormal, optimal, or ideal conditions.On this view, it’s not
that these kinds of people take pleasure in it because it’s beautiful, but
rather, the fact that these kinds of people take pleasure in it is what it is
for it to be beautiful.
In contrast with HRD about beauty, HRD about morality is nowhere
near as popular. But this point requires a bit of clarification. The compar-
ison is not about just any kind of constitutive dependence on pleasure. As
discussed in Section III, not all kinds of mind-dependence are incompat-
ible with realism. And this point is especially salient here because there
is a well-known family of views that hold that moral goodness depends
25. For arguments against, see James Shelley, “Against Value Empiricism in Aesthet-
ics,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2010): 707–20; Dominic McIver Lopes, “Aesthetic
Experts, Guides to Value,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (2015): 235–46; Watkins
and Shelley, “Response-Dependence about Aesthetic Value.”
Hanson Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim 49
This content downloaded from 082.132.184.024 on December 12, 2018 07:42:59 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
constitutively on pleasure that are not antirealist, namely, hedonic utili-
tarianism.
As noted in Section III, there are a number of proposals in the litera-
tureof how todistinguishbetween the antirealist kindofmind-dependence
and the other kinds. It’s an interesting question whether all of these do an
equally good job of capturing and explaining the intuitive distinction.26
What’s important here, however, is this: assuming that the distinction can
be drawn in the right kind of way, you might think that Pleasure could
be a basis for an argument for the asymmetry claim. HRD about beauty
entails aesthetic antirealism, and if HRD about morality doesn’t hold,
we have an argument against aesthetic realism that lacks a counterpart in
themoral case:
H1: HRD about beauty holds: what it is for something to be beau-
tiful is for it to occasion pleasure in certain kinds of observers under
certain conditions.
H2: If HRD about beauty holds, then realism about beauty must
be false.
H3: So realism about beauty is false.
The argument is certainly valid. Despite its validity, however, the ar-
gument shouldn’t worry the aesthetic realist. HRD about beauty entails
aesthetic antirealism because HRD is just a species of aesthetic antireal-
ism. So the argument fromHRD to antirealism is not dialectically useful—
you would already need to be an aesthetic antirealist to be an HRD theo-
rist about beauty. The obvious way out for the aesthetic realist, then, is to
reject the first premise.
There are two ways the argument could be rescued. One is if it could
be supplemented by a compelling argument for HRD about beauty; the
other is if HRD about beauty were intuitively obvious enough to not re-
quire argument.
Consider the latter first. Could it be that HRD about beauty is intu-
itively obvious? It’s not clear that there is strong intuitive support for it. It
26. It is an interesting question why HRD is antirealist while hedonic utilitarianism is
realist (or at least not automatically antirealist). My own view on this is that Enoch’s nor-
mative relevance criterion pinpoints the relevant difference between the kind of mind-
dependence the realist is denying and the kind she is not. So the debate on mind-
dependence between moral realists and antirealists is about whether anything mental or
mind-dependent bears on the moral facts in any way other than by being normatively rel-
evant. If this is right, then it suggests the following rationale for classifying HRD as anti-
realist and hedonic utilitarianism as realist. HRD theorists are not saying that pleasure is
normatively relevant to beauty; they are saying that pleasure bears on beauty in some way
other than being normatively relevant. Hedonic utilitarians, on the other hand, say that
pleasure bears on moral status by being normatively relevant.
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may be highly intuitive that beauty is (often) pleasing to experience. But
that’s a different (and weaker) claim than the HRD claim that the occa-
sioning of pleasure in a certain kind of observer is what beauty consists in.
The realist can accept that weaker claim—she can say that beauty is some-
thing we take pleasure in, or something that does occasion pleasure in ap-
propriately situated observers. She just denies that beauty is constituted
by such pleasure—just as themoral realist can say that we tend to approve
ofmoral goodness anddisapprove ofmoral badness—but these responses
aren’t what moral goodness and badness consist in.
If HRD about beauty is right, then, it’s not obviously the case. The
aesthetic HRD theorist would need an argument for her view. Are there
any good arguments for it? The first thing to note is that there is a con-
spicuous absence of arguments for HRD about beauty in the literature.
The arguments I will go on to discuss in Sections VI–VIII could
each—if successful—be taken as an argument for HRD about beauty.
But even if this is so, each could equally be taken as an argument for the
less demanding thesis of antirealism about beauty. Since their success as
arguments for asymmetry requires only that they support aesthetic anti-
realism, my focus will be on whether they succeed in that objective. I will
argue that they fail to establish aesthetic antirealism. If I am right, then
a fortiori they fail as arguments for HRD.
V. AFFECTIVE RESPONSES
Not only is it commonly held that beauty is constitutively dependent on
pleasure in the way discussed in Section IV, but it is also commonly held
that pleasure has an essential role in aesthetic judgment.
Note that the latter isn’t the same view as the HRD view discussed in
Section IV, though the two views may go well together. It’s not the same
view because you could think that beauty is constitutively dependent on
pleasure in the way HRD says it is, without holding that the only possible
way to judge something beautiful is by having a feeling of pleasure. (For
example, you could think that beauty is a disposition to occasion pleasure
in observers who meet certain conditions. This view lends itself naturally
to the thought that, at least for observers who don’t meet the relevant
conditions, finding out that something is beautiful is a matter of finding
out whether the relevant kinds of observers take pleasure in it—and this
is something you could do without you yourself having any kind of feel-
ing of pleasure, or indeed any other affective response.)
Call the view that affective responses are essential to judgment in a
given domain the affective model of the relevant kind of judgment.27 While
27. I borrow this terminology from Terence Cuneo, “Signs of Value,” British Journal for
the History of Philosophy 14 (2006): 69–91.
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many take the affectivemodel of aesthetic judgment to be obviously right,
moral judgment is not usually taken to be an obvious candidate for the af-
fectivemodel: a lot of people want to say that while youmight have certain
affective responses when you make moral judgments (moral outrage, for
example), these aren’t essential tomoral judgment. I think that many have
found the asymmetry claim plausible because they take this contrast to ob-
tain, and they take realism to be incompatible with the affective model. The
argument would be this:
P1. Affective Asymmetry Premise: Aesthetic judgment differs
from moral judgment in essentially involving affective responses.
P2. Incompatibilist Premise: If judgments in a particular domain
essentially involve affective responses, then realism with respect to
that domain is false.
C. So aesthetic realism is untenable in a way that moral realism is not.
Is this argument any good? One way to challenge it would be to put
pressure on the incompatibilist premise, the claim that the affective model
is an obstacle to realism. But this is not the challenge I will pose here. In-
stead, I will focus on the affective asymmetry premise, the claim that the
involvement of affective responses is a point of contrast between moral
and aesthetic judgments. This is a very widely held claim, but, I will argue,
it is actually rather hard to motivate.
Note that the affective asymmetry premise doesn’t look to be obvi-
ously true. First, if judging something to be beautiful essentially involves
having a response of aesthetic pleasure, then we should expect that there
should be something wrong with asserting (1) in something like the way
that there is something wrong with asserting the Moore-paradoxical sen-
tence (2):
(1) It’s beautiful but I don’t like it.
(2) It’s true but I don’t believe it.
But it’s not clear that there is. Asserting (1) doesn’t sound contradictory
in the way that asserting (2) does.
Second, if affective asymmetry holds, we should also expect that
(1) would sound worse than (3):
(3) It’s morally good but I don’t approve of it.
And it’s not clear that it does. In fact, you might think not only that
(1) doesn’t sound worse than (3) but also that in some ways it sounds
much better than (3).
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If the affective asymmetry premise is to be justified, then we need
some other kind of argument for it. In Sections VI–VIII, I consider three
related differences that have been taken to hold between the moral and
the aesthetic domains and generate arguments for affective asymmetry.
These are the arguments fromDescriptions, Acquaintance, and Prin-
ciples. Each of these arguments pinpoints an apparent restriction on
when aesthetic judgments can be made, which, it is claimed, (i) lacks a
counterpart in themoral case and(ii) strongly suggests that aesthetic judg-
ments essentially involve affective responses.
VI. DESCRIPTIONS
Descriptions: You can make a moral judgment on the basis of an
accurate, nonmoral description. This is not the case for aesthetic
judgments—no amount of nonaesthetic, or nonevaluative, descrip-
tions of something will put you in a position to judge whether some-
thing is beautiful.
On the face of it, it sounds like the Descriptions claim picks out a
genuine contrast. If you tell me, entirely in nonmoral terms, that your
friend Betty did such-and-such, I can, in principle, be in a position thereby
tomake amoral judgment about whether what Betty did wasmorally wrong
or not (provided that you give me accurate and sufficiently detailed in-
formation). Matters look different for aesthetic judgment: no amount of
nonaesthetic, or nonevaluative, descriptions of something will put me in
a position to judge whether it is beautiful.
Why would the Descriptions claim support the affective model of
aesthetic judgment? One argument would be the following inference-to-
the-best-explanation argument:
Ds1. Aesthetic judgments can’t be based on descriptions of their
objects.
Ds2. The best explanation for this is that aesthetic judgments es-
sentially involve affective responses.
Ds3. So aesthetic judgments essentially involve affective responses.
This argument is unconvincing. The problem is Ds2. Why should
we think that the involvement of affective responses would even be an ex-
planation, let alone the best one? In order for the involvement of affec-
tive responses to be an explanation for the inadequacy of descriptions,
it would have to be the case that descriptions don’t put you in a position
to have affective responses to the object described. But this is not in gen-
eral the case. Some people hold that moral judgments require emotional
Hanson Moral Realism, Aesthetic Realism, and the Asymmetry Claim 53
This content downloaded from 082.132.184.024 on December 12, 2018 07:42:59 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
responses, and these people don’t have to deny thatmoral judgments can
be made on the basis of descriptions. Many of the situations we emotion-
ally respond to, we do so having heard them described, rather than actu-
ally watching themunfold. People are oftenmorally upset, outraged, and
so on, about events they have heard about via descriptions in news stories.
So given that these emotional responses can be had on the basis of descrip-
tions in themoral case, and since emotional responses are a kind of affec-
tive response, it certainly can’t be that in general the impossibility of form-
ing a particular kind of judgment on the basis of a description could be
explained by the hypothesis that judgments of that kind are based on af-
fective responses. And if that kind of argument doesn’t work in general,
those whomake the argument in the aesthetic case need, at the very least,
to say what is special about this case.
The asymmetry theorist can respond with a refined version of the ar-
gument. As noted above, those who hold that aesthetic judgments must
be based on affective responses usually have a particular kind of affective
response in mind: standardly pleasure of some specific-but-hard-to-pin-
down kind. Call this “aesthetic pleasure.” And it’s this specific response
of aesthetic pleasure, they will argue, that can’t be had on the basis of a
description, even if other affective responses can be. The best explanation,
they will then argue, for why aesthetic judgments can’t be based on de-
scriptions is that aesthetic judgments are based on that particular kind
of affective response.
Ds1. Aesthetic judgments can’t be based on descriptions of their
objects.
Ds2*. The best explanation for this is that aesthetic judgment es-
sentially involves having the specific response of aesthetic pleasure.
Ds3. So aesthetic judgments essentially involve affective responses.
This argument is an improvement on the previous one. It does look
plausible that descriptions of an object don’t put you in a position to have
this particular kind of response to it. Suppose you described to someone
a painting: it’s in the impressionist style, there’s lots of blue, it’s an out-
door scene with three figures. It would probably strike you as odd or oth-
erwise infelicitous if they said “Ah, I’m at a loss for words!” and claimed to
be experiencing this response of aesthetic pleasure ( just as it would strike
you as odd if they had said “It’s beautiful” just on the basis of that descrip-
tion). The involvement of aesthetic pleasure, then, is a more promising
candidate for an explanation of the inadequacy of descriptions. But is it
the best explanation? This looks doubtful, I will argue, since there is a
promising alternative explanation.
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A. An Alternative Explanation
By and large, independently of whether they are evaluative realists or anti-
realists, most people accept that evaluative judgments of an object should
be responsive to certain nonevaluative features of that object. Without be-
ing aware of certain details of what Betty did, you’re not in a position to
judge that what Betty did was wrong. Similarly, without any awareness of
what Ryoanji looks like, you’re not in a position to judge that it is beauti-
ful.28 Call this the minimal epistemic requirement (MER). MER should strike
youasquiteabanalpoint.But it candoa surprisingamountofexplanatory
work.
Let’s consider three quick points about MER. First, MER imposes dif-
ferent requirements on judges depending on the kind of evaluative judg-
ment they are making. The kinds of features of something that you need
to be aware of in order to be in a position to judge it morally are very likely
different from the kinds of features you need to be aware of to judge it aes-
thetically.
Second, MER doesn’t presuppose any particular metaevaluative view.
In particular, it’s worth noting that it is compatible with an affective model
of the judgments in question. Consider a view that takesmoral judgments
to be affective responses of certain kinds of approval anddisapproval. This
kind of picture can accommodate MER because it can hold that if you
don’t know what Betty did, then the relevant kind of disapproval is not
available to you, and you aren’t able to even count as judging her action
morally wrong. Or consider a view that takes aesthetic judgments to be
responses of certain kinds of pleasure and displeasure. People who hold
this view can accommodate MER because they can hold that without any
awareness of what Ryoanji looks like, the relevant kind of pleasure is not
available to you, and so you aren’t able to even count as judging it beautiful.
Third, whether the responses in question are cognitive or affective,
MER is a genuinely epistemic requirement, in the sense that it requires the
28. One possible exception to this might be judgments formed on the basis of testi-
mony, but this is highly contentious. Many deny that testimony can yield knowledge onmoral
or aesthetic matters. See, e.g., Roger Crisp, “Moral Testimony Pessimism: A Defence,” Sup-
plement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 88 (2014): 129–43; Daniel Whiting, “The
Glass Is Half Empty: A New Argument for Pessimism about Aesthetic Testimony,” British
Journal of Aesthetics 55 (2015): 91–107. But some argue that testimony can give you aesthetic
knowledge. See Malcolm Budd, “The Acquaintance Principle,” British Journal of Aesthetics 43
(2003): 386–92. In any case, the spirit—if not the letter—of the above is highly plausible. If
testimony can give you knowledge on moral and aesthetic matters, then the claim above
has an exception—but it is still plausible that firsthand (i.e., nontestimonially acquired)
evaluative judgments need to be responsive to certain features of the object. If testimony
can’t give you evaluative knowledge, on the other hand, then the formulation above ap-
pears to be in good shape.
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judger to be aware (at least at the time of making the judgment) of certain
features of reality. Perhaps the awareness doesn’t need to be knowledge;
perhaps it doesn’t even need to be belief (in the sense that you can be
aware of something without having any conscious beliefs about it). But
in any case, awareness is still an epistemic state (even if it turns out to be
a rather minimal one), and so the requirement that one be aware of cer-
tain features is a genuinely epistemic one.
MER suggests a plausible explanation of why you can’t judge an ob-
ject beautiful on the basis of a description of it. You can’t come to know
what it looks like (or indeed, sounds like) froma description of it. Nor can
you even become aware of what an object looks like or sounds like from a
description of it. And so (at least if judgments of beauty must always be
responsive to an object’s perceptual appearance), descriptions won’t be
an adequate basis for such judgments. Descriptions don’t put you in a po-
sition to make aesthetic judgments because they don’t enable you to meet
MER. Descriptions of objects don’t put you in touch with the features that
aesthetic judgments should be responsive to.
Call this the epistemic explanation, since it takes the problem to be
that descriptions don’t allow you to meet an epistemic requirement for
aesthetic judgment. Interestingly, the epistemic explanation of the De-
scriptions claimdoesn’t take it to indicate any particularly deep contrast
betweenmoral and aesthetic judgments. The two different kinds of judg-
ments are responsive to different kinds of features of their objects. The
kinds of features that are relevant to moral judgment are different from
the kinds of features relevant to aesthetic judgment. And as youmight ex-
pect from this, different ways of apprehending their objects are appropri-
ate as bases for the different judgments. Aesthetic judgments can bemade
on the basis of photographs, but can moral judgments? Perhaps they can
given a certain amount of context, but can a photo alone be enough? Prob-
ably not.29
Both photos and descriptions are what we might call proxies, things
we can use to become aware of certain features of something else. It hap-
pens to be the case that the features that are relevant to the moral status
of an action can in general be captured quite well in a description and not
very well in a photo. And the features that are relevant to the aesthetic sta-
tus of an object can be captured quite well in a photo and not very well in
29. It’s hard to think of a case where the moral features of an action would be appar-
ent from a photograph. Perhaps the most promising kind of case would be something like
showing you a photograph of Betty tripping someone up. But even in this kind of case, it’s
unclear that the photo alone could put you in a position to make a moral judgment. Unless
I also tell you that what you see in the photo really is what it looks like, and that it wasn’t an
accident, nor was it a joke, and that she really intended to trip this person up, it’s not plau-
sible that you’ll have enough information to be in a position to pronounce on the moral
status of her action.
56 Ethics October 2018
This content downloaded from 082.132.184.024 on December 12, 2018 07:42:59 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
a description. This shouldn’t be surprising. The nature of proxies is to
capture some features well and others less well. Depending on the kind
of evaluative judgment one is making, different nonevaluative features
will be important, so different kinds of proxy will be suited to different
kinds of evaluative judgment.
B. Why Prefer the Epistemic Explanation?
We have two explanations to choose between: the epistemic explanation
(descriptions don’t put you in touch with all the features to which an aes-
thetic judgment should be responsive) and the affective explanation (you
can’t have a response of aesthetic pleasure to something on the basis only
of a description of it). For the argument from descriptions to work, the
affective explanation needs to be the best explanation. But there is good
reason to think that the epistemic explanation is a better explanation.
Here is why.
Proponents of the affective explanation need it to be the case that
the particular affective response of aesthetic pleasure can’t be had on the
basis of a description. We might ask why it can’t be. What can they say in
response to this question? Given that affective responses in general are
not impossible to have from a description, it must be that the reason this
particular kind of affective response can’t be had on the basis of a descrip-
tion has something to do with the particular kind of affective response it
is, rather than with the fact that it is an affective response.
What is it about this particular kind of affective response? The most
plausible thing to say is that it’s the fact that it is a response to certain fea-
tures of an object. Descriptions don’t put us in touch with these features,
and that’s why the response isn’t available. This seems sensible. If there is
a distinctive response of aesthetic pleasure, then like aesthetic judgment,
it should be a response to the perceptual appearance of objects. And de-
scriptions can’t put us in touch with objects’ perceptual appearances.
If the proponent of the affective explanation says this, however, she is
committing to everything that the epistemic explanation is committed to.
She’s accepting that descriptions can’t put us in touch with the perceptual
appearance of objects. And she’s accepting that aesthetic judgments (de-
rivatively on aesthetic responses) must be responsive to objects’ appear-
ances. But she is also committing to one extra thing: that aesthetic judg-
ments involve affective responses. This extra commitment is not doing any
explanatory work. The epistemic explanation, after all, works without it.
So the epistemic explanation is to be preferred.
The argument for the involvement of affective responses was pre-
cisely that it does important explanatory work. I’ve shown that this is false;
all the same explanatory work can be done without it. All you need is the
claim that aesthetic judgments are responsive to perceptual appearances
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of objects and the claim that descriptions can’t put us in touch with these
appearances. The inference-to-the-best-explanation argument from the
Descriptions claim fails tomotivate the affectivemodel of aesthetic judg-
ment.
C. Nonperceptual Beauty
There is potentially a further problem for the argument from Descrip-
tions. In my objections to it so far I have assumed that beauty depends
on perceptual appearances and that judging something beautiful re-
quires awareness of its perceptual appearance. But is this assumption cor-
rect? Many people hold that the things that can be appropriately judged
beautiful are not exhausted by perceptible objects. As noted in Section III,
proofs, chess moves, and theories are often held to be capable of being
beautiful.
If there are cases of beauty that are not perceptual, this would cause
further problems for the argument from Descriptions. Let me explain.
If there is nonperceptual beauty, this may spell trouble for the De-
scriptions claim itself. At the very least, it introduces a need for clarifi-
cation on what a description is. Does a statement explaining a theory in
enough detail for someone to fully grasp it count as a description of it?
Does one count as describing a proof if one spells it out very precisely, line
by line? If these count as descriptions, then presumably one can, after all,
judge the beauty of a proof or a theory on the basis of a description of it. If
this is right, then theDescriptions point would be false: the inadequacy
of descriptions would not, after all, be a point of contrast between moral
and aesthetic judgments. The inadequacy of descriptions would not char-
acterize the aesthetic case as a whole; rather, it would hold only for a sub-
set of aesthetic judgments: judgments of perceptual beauty. And it would
be a feature of these aesthetic cases simply by virtue of the fact that they
are also perceptual. The inadequacy of descriptions would be a hallmark
not of the aesthetic but of the perceptual.
If, on the other hand, the asymmetry theorist insists that spelling out
a proof line by line and explaining a theory thoroughly enough for some-
one to grasp it don’t count as giving descriptions of the proof and the the-
ory, respectively, she owes an explanation of why. Perhaps the suggestion
will be that it is criterial of descriptions that they leave out some informa-
tion about the thing described. Not just any verbal recounting qualifies as
a description: these examples don’t count as descriptions because they
are too thorough—they don’t leave out any information.
But if this is what ismeant by ‘description’, is Ds1 plausible? Is it plau-
sible that one can’t make aesthetic judgments, even of nonperceptual
beauty, if any information is left out? I think the best argument the asym-
metry theorist can give is to appeal to what I’ll call the extreme Sibleyan pic-
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ture: the idea that every characteristic of an object is aesthetically relevant.
Frank Sibley, in an influential article, makes amilder version of this point:
First, the particular aesthetic character of something may be said to
result from the totality of its relevant nonaesthetic characteristics. It
is always conceivable that, by some relatively small change in line or
color in a picture, a note inmusic, or a word in a poem, the aesthetic
charactermay be lost or quite transformed (thoughpossible also that
by some considerable changes it may not be significantly altered). A
somewhat different totality might result in an aesthetic difference.
Features one would hardly think of singling out as notably contrib-
uting to its aesthetic character—say, background colors, hardly no-
ticed brush strokes, and so on—nevertheless do contribute because,
being as they are, they at least allow it to have the character it has, a
character it conceivably might not have if they were altered.30
Sibley’s point is more moderate than the kind of picture the asymmetry
theorist would need here, since he allows that it’s possible that some
changes would fail to impact aesthetic character. But a more extreme ver-
sion of Sibley’s thought would hold that every characteristic of an object
is aesthetically relevant. If this extreme Sibleyan picture is right, then de-
scriptions, understood as verbal recountings that leave something out, will
be inadequate bases for aesthetic judgment, since they always leave out
something aesthetically relevant.
However, while this line of thought supplies a motivation for Ds1, it
does so at the cost of puttingDs2* (and indeed the original Ds2) on shaky
ground. The way the extreme Sibleyan picture motivates Ds1 is by supply-
ing an explanation for it, namely, the reason that descriptions fail to be
adequate bases for aesthetic judgment is that they fail to put us in touch
with all of the aesthetically relevant features. But this just is the epistemic
explanation again, and since the epistemic explanation is not committed
to the affective model, it entirely undermines Ds2*.
So the extreme Sibleyan picture can’t motivate Ds1 without under-
mining Ds2*. Unfortunately for the asymmetry theorist, it’s not clear
what, besides the extreme Sibleyan picture, couldmotivate Ds1. If you tell
me quite a lot about a theory, for example, and you leave out some details
(so, by the criterion under discussion, you count as describing it), but you
leave out nothing that is relevant to its beauty, it’s hard to see why we
should deny that I am in a position to judge it beautiful. The extreme
Sibleyan picture amounted to denying that this was possible—if you leave
something out, then a fortiori you leave something out that is relevant to
30. Frank Sibley, “Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic,” Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 135–59,
138.
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beauty. But if the extreme Sibleyan picture is false, this situation is possi-
ble, and it’s hard to see the motivation for denying that, in such a situa-
tion, I could be in a position to judge the theory beautiful.
To summarize, the Descriptions point was raised as a way to argue
for affective asymmetry. For this to work, there needs to be an argumen-
tative route from the inadequacy of descriptions for aesthetic judgment
to the affective model of aesthetic judgment. The best candidate looked
to be the following inference-to-the-best-explanation argument:
Ds1. You can’t judge something aesthetically on the basis of a de-
scription of it.
Ds2*. The best explanation for this is that aesthetic judgment es-
sentially involves having the specific response of aesthetic pleasure.
Ds3. So aesthetic judgment essentially involves having the specific
response of aesthetic pleasure.
I noted that there may be a question of how to interpret Ds1, de-
pending on whether there is nonperceptual beauty. I argued that on any
plausibly true interpretation of Ds1, Ds2* looks false. On any plausible
interpretation of Ds1, what does the explanatory work is the claim that
descriptions can’t put you in touch with the relevant features of an object
(either because they can’t put you in touch with the object’s perceptual
appearance, and judgments of beauty are responsive to perceptual ap-
pearance, or because descriptions always leave out some information,
and that information is relevant to beauty).
VII. ACQUAINTANCE
Acquaintance: A constraint known as the Acquaintance Princi-
ple holds in aesthetics, but not in ethics. In order to judge, say, that
your friend Betty acted wrongly, I don’t need to have been there,
seen her action unfold, observed the consequences of it for myself,
and so on, but in the case of my judgment that, say, the Torre del
Oro in Seville is beautiful, things are different: I do need to see it
for myself.
Some philosophers have argued that the Acquaintance Principle
(AP) holding in the aesthetic case is best explained by the affective model
of aesthetic judgment.31 The reason you need to see the Torre del Oro for
yourself to judge it beautiful is that judging something beautiful is a mat-
31. See McKeever and Ridge, “Aesthetics and Particularism”; Scruton, Art and Imagi-
nation, 54; Todd, “Quasi-realism, Acquaintance, and the Norms of Aesthetic Judgement.”
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ter of having a certain kind of affective response to it. SeanMcKeever and
Michael Ridge, for example, suggest that it is the role of affective re-
sponses in aesthetic judgments that “holds the key to explaining the spe-
cial role of direct engagement in aesthetic judgment.”32
If McKeever and Ridge are right that (i) AP applies to all aesthetic
judgments, (ii) the best explanation for this is that aesthetic judgments
essentially involve affective responses, and (iii) AP doesn’t hold in ethics,
then this is an argument for thinking that aesthetic judgments essentially
involve affective responses, without any corresponding commitment to
thinking that moral judgments involve them.
The argument from Acquaintance is in fact underspecified. There
are various different ways of understanding AP andwhat exactly it amounts
to. The crucial question is whether there is any reading of AP on which
both (i) and (ii) are plausible. I will argue that there is not.
The usual way to understand AP is as a requirement that one’s judg-
ment be based on a perceptual encounter with its object. You have to see
it, hear it, and so on. Call this AP1.
AP1: Aesthetic judgment must be based on a perceptual encoun-
ter with its object.
AP1 doesn’t look to be true. Most people accept that you can, at least
in some cases, judge the visual beauty of something on the basis of a pho-
tograph of it. It is also plausible that you can judge the beauty of amusical
work on the basis of reading its score. If this is right, and if AP is to hold
for all aesthetic judgments, acquaintance needs to be construed in a way
that allows that looking at a photo of an object can acquaint you with that
object and reading a score of a musical work can acquaint you with that
work.
Photos and scores can put you in touch with the perceptual appear-
ance of their objects, even though they are not ways of encountering those
objects. Through looking at a photo, you can come to know what an ob-
ject looks like, and through reading a score, you can come to know what a
piece of music sounds like. So perhaps AP should be understood not in
terms of perceptual encounters but in terms of awareness of perceptual
properties. Call this AP2.
AP2: Aesthetic judgment must be based on an awareness of the
object’s perceptual properties.
Would understanding acquaintance in terms of AP2 help the argu-
ment from Acquaintance? No; if acquaintance is understood in terms
of AP2, the asymmetry theorist faces a dilemma. Either there is nonper-
32. McKeever and Ridge, “Aesthetics and Particularism,” 274.
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ceptual beauty, or there isn’t. If there is nonperceptual beauty, AP2 is
false. If there isn’t, and all beauty is perceptual, then AP2 just falls out of
MER: it just amounts to the banal claim that aesthetic judgments must be
responsive to the aesthetically relevant features of their objects. This is par-
alleled by the fact thatmoral judgmentsmust be responsive to themorally
relevant features of their objects.MER’s applying to aesthetic judgments is
no more in need of explanation than its applying to moral judgments. So
the claim that the affective model of aesthetic judgment must be brought
in to do explanatory work is entirely unconvincing.
Perhaps the asymmetry theorist should resort to a reading of AP
that has nothing to do with the perceptual. Perhaps she should say that
all that is required for acquaintance is awareness of all of the object’s prop-
erties, perceptual or not. Call this AP3.
AP3: Aesthetic judgment must be based on awareness of all of the
object’s properties.
AP3 is far too demanding. Wemake aesthetic judgments all the time
without knowing everything about the object we’re judging. But even put-
ting that worry on hold, it’s entirely unconvincing that the best expla-
nation for AP3—were it true—would be the affective model of aesthetic
judgment. Again, the epistemic explanation looks more plausible: if aes-
thetic judgment of something requires awareness of all of its properties,
the natural explanation for this would be that all of its properties are aes-
thetically relevant, and aesthetic judgmentsmust be responsive to the aes-
thetically relevant features of their objects.
In summary, the problem with the argument from Acquaintance
is similar to the problem faced by the argument from Descriptions. If
there is a sense of “acquaintance” in which it is plausible that acquain-
tance is required for all judgments of beauty, this looks to be easily ac-
commodated as a consequence of the epistemic requirement that judg-
ments of beauty must be based on awareness of that object’s aesthetically
relevant features.
VIII. PRINCIPLES
Principles: Aesthetic judgments do not involve the application of
principles, but moral judgments do. At least one way to judge the
moral status of the action is to apply principles, but you can never
come to a view on whether something is beautiful by applying prin-
ciples.33
33. The Principles point might be thought to be very closely related to the Descrip-
tions point, but it is worth noting that they can come apart. If you can judge on the basis of
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Principles is the third alleged point of contrast between moral and
aesthetic judgments that might be used to generate an argument for af-
fective asymmetry. For the argument to work, two things would need to
be the case. First, Principles needs to be a genuine point of contrast be-
tween the moral and the aesthetic. Second, it also needs to be the case
that the lack of a role for principles in aesthetic judgment would put pres-
sure on us to adopt the affective model of aesthetic judgment. There may
well be good reasons to accept the former, but—I will argue—there are
no good reasons to accept the latter.
The contrast in Principles is both widely accepted and plausible.
At least since Kant,34 the contention that aesthetic judgment is not prin-
cipled has been orthodoxy in philosophical aesthetics.35 Those who de-
fend the view that aesthetic principles even exist are often described iron-
ically as “heroic”!36 But in the moral case, the mainstream view is that
moral judgment is principled. There are people—particularists, of whom
Jonathan Dancy is the best-known example—who deny that moral judg-
ment is principled, but this is a minority view, and particularists tend to
take themselves to have the burden of proof. Tellingly, in his arguments
for moral particularism, Dancy takes aesthetics to be a domain where par-
34. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, sec. 8.6: “If we judge objects merely in terms of con-
cepts, then we lose all presentation of beauty. This is why there can be no rule by which
someone could be compelled to acknowledge that something is beautiful. No one can
use reasons or principles to talk us into a judgement on whether some garment, house,
or flower is beautiful.” See also Christopher Janaway, “Kant’s Aesthetics and the ‘Empty
Cognitive Stock,’” in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays, ed. Paul Guyer
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 67–86, 74: “There are no principles of taste;
again because my judgements of taste require as ground this ‘direct’ inspection of an ob-
ject and this testing of it against my own feelings, there could be no intersubjective rules
anyone could use to prove the things’ beauty to me.”
35. Mary Mothersill, in what appears essentially to be an argument from authority,
writes, “It does not matter whether you speak of criterial features or of principles of taste:
there are none. It is Kant’s single greatest contribution to the subject to have made the
point and to have insisted upon it.” See Mary Mothersill, “Aesthetic Laws, Principles and
Properties,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47 (1989): 77–82, 78.
36. The oft-repeated dig at Monroe Beardsley’s attempt to argue for aesthetic princi-
ples originates from Frank Sibley. See Monroe Beardsley, “On the Generality of Critical
Reasons,” Journal of Philosophy 59 (1962): 477–86; Frank Sibley, “General Criteria and Rea-
sons in Aesthetics,” in Essays on Aesthetics, ed. J. Fisher (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1983), 3–20.
a description that something is morally wrong or right, it doesn’t obviously follow that if
you are doing so, you are using moral principles. Again, even those who argue for moral
particularism can acknowledge that moral judgments can be made on the basis of descrip-
tions. I might judge that Betty acted wrongly, after hearing a faithful nonmoral description
of what she did, but the question of whether my judgment involved applying principles is
still open.
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ticularism is uncontroversially right, and he tries to support moral partic-
ularism by drawing an analogy with aesthetics.37
Themainstream view, then, is that Principlesmarks a genuine con-
trast between moral and aesthetic judgments. Moreover, there are good
reasons to think that the mainstream has it right. In order to see this, we
need to distinguish between two kinds of principle: decisive principles and
contributory principles. Decisive principles of moral goodness would be
principles that say which nonmoral properties would guarantee that an
action is morally good; contributory, or pro tanto, principles would be
principles that identify nonmoral features as counting toward or count-
ing against an action’s being morally good.38
Here are two reasons to think that it is plausible that moral judg-
ment involves at least contributory principles and less plausible that aes-
thetic judgment does. First, there has been some degree of convergence
on what contributory moral principles would be, but much less on con-
tributory aesthetic principles. Most people will accept that keeping prom-
ises and occasioning pleasure count toward an action’s goodness, while
lying and stealing count against it, but it is hard to find any counterparts
that enjoy such widespread acceptance regarding beauty. There has been
very little progress in identifying even plausible candidates for aesthetic
principles. Second, the phenomenology of the respective judgments sup-
ports the contrast too. Aesthetic judgment just doesn’t typically feel as
though it involves reasoning: it has what some have called “phenomeno-
logical immediacy,”39 in that it feels more like one is just struck by some-
thing’s beauty than that one reasons to a conclusion that it is beautiful.
Moral judgments, on the other hand, do often feel as though they involve
reasoning.
There may be room to contest this picture, but in any case this won’t
be my focus here. Let’s assume, then, that Principles marks a genuine
contrast between moral and aesthetic judgments. What I’m interested in
is the argument from Principles to the affective model of aesthetic judg-
ment. As with Descriptions and Acquaintance, the argument is an
inference-to-the-best-explanation argument:
Pr1. Aesthetic judgment does not involve applying principles.
Pr2. The best explanation for this is that aesthetic judgment es-
sentially involves affective responses.
37. See Jonathan Dancy, “Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties,”
Mind 92 (1983): 530–47, esp. 546.
38. See Jonathan Dancy, Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Clarendon), 5–6.
39. FabianDorsch, “Noninferentialism about Justification—the Case of Aesthetic Judge-
ments,” Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2013): 660–82.
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Pr3. So aesthetic judgment must essentially involve affective re-
sponses.
Pr2 is highly doubtful. In fact, you might think it’s distinctly odd.
After all, moral particularists are often moral realists, so isn’t there some-
thing strange about using aesthetic particularism to argue ultimately for
aesthetic antirealism? The asymmetry theorist would certainly need to say
something to this worry. But perhaps she can. Perhaps she will be able to
show that moral particularists are wrong to be moral realists. In any case,
I will pursue a different line of argument against Pr2 here.
The affective model of aesthetic judgment would be a possible ex-
planation for the lack of a role for principles. If judging something beau-
tiful were always a matter of feeling a certain way about it, then we should
expect that the application of principles would play no role in such a judg-
ment. However, there is another possible explanation for why judgments
of beautynever take this inferential form. Someproperties wediscernnon-
inferentially, rather than as the outcome of a process of reasoning, from
the presence of other properties.
Many hold, for example, that perceptual judgments fall into this cat-
egory: we don’t infer from other propositions (e.g., about our sensory
experience) that certain objects with certain properties are before us.
Rather, we just notice the objects.
Further, some perceptual noninferentialists point out that if there
are properties of visual experience that are linked in a principled way to
the presence of particular objects, these are not properties that we ordi-
narily notice. As Strawson puts it, “An observer, gazing through his win-
dow, may perhaps, by an effort of will, bring himself to see, or even will-
lessly find himself seeing, what he knows to be the branches of the trees
no longer as branches at all, but as an intricate pattern of dark lines of
complex directions and shapes and various sizes against a background
of varying shades of grey. The frame of mind in which we enjoy, if we ever
do enjoy, this kind of experience is a rare and sophisticated, not a stan-
dard or normal, frame of mind.”40
It’s highly plausible that analogous points hold concerning beauty:
(i) Standardly, we discern beauty immediately, not via first discern-
ing properties other than beauty and then inferring from the
presence of these properties, together with a principle linking
them to beauty, that the object is beautiful.
(ii) If there are other properties that are linked in a principled way
to beauty, these are not properties that strike us with the imme-
40. Peter Strawson, “Perception and Its Objects,” in Philosophical Writings (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1979), 125–45, 131.
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diacy that beauty does, and we’re not ordinarily in a position to
characterize these properties.
If this noninferentialist picture is right, it would be a natural expla-
nation for the lack of role for principles in judgments of beauty. If beauty
were a property that we could discern noninferentially, we wouldn’t have
any need, in aesthetic judgment, for principles linking other properties to
beauty. Further, if other properties that are linked in a principled way
to beauty are not easy for us to consciously pick out, or at least are less easy
to pick out than beauty itself, it would be entirely expectable that we
would not use principles in judgments of beauty. More generally, princi-
ples linking certain nontarget properties to some target property are only
useful if these nontarget properties are easier for us to pick out than the
target property itself. If we have immediate awareness of the target prop-
erty and are only able to identify the nontarget properties through con-
siderable effort, these principles are of no use to us in judgments con-
cerning the target property. It should be unsurprising that judgments of
the target property proceed without the use of such principles.
Moreover, this explanation doesn’t rely on characterizing judgments
of beauty as affective, just as the noninferential account of perception
doesn’t relyoncharacterizingperceptual judgmentsasaffective. Sowehave
here an alternative explanation to the affective model. Unless the asym-
metry theorist can supply some reason to think that the affective model
of aesthetic judgment would be a better explanation than the noninfer-
ential explanation, the argument from Principles fails to establish the
asymmetry claim.
A. An Objection
There appears to be a tension between the view I’ve argued for here and
what I said in Sections VI and VII. I argued in Sections VI and VII that aes-
thetic judgments must be based on awareness of certain nonaesthetic fea-
tures. But here I’ve argued that judgments of beauty don’t involve reason-
ing. Are these two claims in tension with each other? How can judgments
of beauty be based on awareness of the object’s aesthetically relevant fea-
tures, unless they involve reasoning from these features? If aesthetic judg-
ments are noninferential, shouldn’t you be able to judge something beau-
tiful without being aware of anything else about it?
Theobjectionassumes that theonly form the “based-on” relation can
take is inferential. But there are reasons to reject this assumption; there
are good reasons to think that there is noninferential based-on-ness. Rob-
ert Audi argues, for example, that facial recognition judgments must be
based on awareness of certain visual patterns but nonetheless don’t typ-
ically involve inference:
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Granted, facial recognitiondependson seeing the features of the face,
as is evidenced by the impossibility of recognition where a number of
features are blocked, say the eyebrows. But such recognition is not
dependent on inference from the relevant features, as is evidenced
by the possibility of recognition even where the perceiver has no be-
lief corresponding to those features. I need not believe Karl’s brows
have the look they do until I focus on the matter. Indeed, the look
they have that is important for my recognition may be so distinc-
tive—or so subtly related to other features, such as the nose and hair-
line—that it would be difficult, or perhaps impossible, to capture the
content of beliefs of properties or, correspondingly, in a set of prem-
ises for inference.41
It is worth looking closely at the arguments here, both for facial rec-
ognition’s being noninferential and for its being based on awareness of
certain features. Both arguments, I will suggest, can bemade just as easily
in the aesthetic case. If I’m right, and if Audi is right about facial recog-
nition, the noninferential nature of aesthetic judgment is not in tension
with its being based on awareness of nonaesthetic properties.
Why should we take facial recognition judgments to be noninferen-
tial? Audi argues that in typical cases of facial recognition we just don’t
have the kinds of beliefs that would be needed as premises if the judg-
ment were inferential. While you need to see certain features in order to
recognize a face, you don’t need to have any beliefs about those features.
Audi offers two considerations in support of this. First, the relevant kinds
of beliefs often don’t happen without conscious reflection: “I need not
believe Karl’s brows have the look they do until I focus on the matter.”
Second, the kinds of beliefs that would be needed as premises for such
an inference would be very difficult to come by: “The look [Karl’s eye-
brows] have that is important for my recognition may be so distinctive—
or so subtly related to other features, such as the nose and hairline—that
it would be difficult, or perhaps impossible, to capture the content of be-
liefs of properties or, correspondingly, in a set of premises for inference.”42
It’s worth adding that these arguments apply to two kinds of belief:
what we might call specific visual beliefs, and principles of facial recog-
nition. If facial recognition involved inference, we’d need beliefs of both
kinds.We’dneedbeliefs such as “the brows have this particular look, which
is related in such-and-such away to the nose, and soon,”but we’d alsoneed
beliefs such as “if the brows have this particular look, which is related in
such-and-such a way to the nose, and so on, then it’s Karl,” or “then this
41. Robert Audi, Moral Perception (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013),
53.
42. Ibid.
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counts defeasibly toward its being Karl.” Not only is it plausible that we
can lack beliefs of thefirst kind and still form facial recognition judgments,
but it is also highly plausible that we can do so while lacking beliefs of the
second kind.
Why should we take facial recognition to be based on awareness of
certain visual features? Audi argues that awareness of certain visual fea-
turesmust be necessary for recognition, because recognition can become
impossible if certain features are blocked (e.g., if you can’t see someone’s
eyebrows). To this we can add that facial recognition is definitely going
to be impossible if you can’t see any of the features. So some awareness
of visual features has got to be a requirement for facial recognition to hap-
pen.
If Audi is right about facial recognition, then this shows that a judg-
ment can be based on awareness of something without being an infer-
ence from it. And if these two features aren’t in tension in the facial rec-
ognition case, then it’s hard to see why they should be in tension in the
case of aesthetic judgment.
Of course, there is potentially room to contest the picture of facial
recognition as noninferential. Some philosophers stress that inference
can be unconscious, as can the beliefs that form its premises. Those who
are sympathetic to that view will have some resources to resist Audi’s argu-
ments about facial recognition. But note that to the extent that this can
be made to fly in the recognition case, it will also be a plausible way to re-
sist the thought that aesthetic judgment proceeds without the use of prin-
ciples, and with it the thought that Principles constitutes a genuine con-
trast between aesthetic and moral judgments.
To summarize, in the previous three sections I considered three kinds
of argument for affective asymmetry. These took the form of three alleged
features of aesthetic judgment that are claimed to (i) support the affective
model of aesthetic judgment and (ii) be a point of contrast with moral
judgments. In each case, while there is plausibly amoral-aesthetic contrast
in the vicinity, there is no compelling argument from it to the affective
model of aesthetic judgment. This might be surprising. The affective
model is often taken to be not only well suited to aesthetic judgments but
also better suited to them than to moral judgments. But in the absence of
any good arguments, we should take seriously the possibility that the affec-
tive model is no better a fit for aesthetic judgments than it is for moral
ones. Many philosophers are sympathetic to the thought that, while we
may feel strongly about moral matters, these strong feelings are impor-
tantly distinct frommoral judgments. If the arguments of SectionsVI–VIII
are right, we should be equally open to an analogous line of thought with
aesthetics: finding things beautiful is enjoyable, but that doesn’t mean that
all there is to finding things beautiful is enjoying them. Either that, or we
should be equally resistant to both.
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IX. CONCLUSION
This article has challenged a particularly pervasive and obstinate feature
of current philosophical orthodoxy: the view that moral realism is more
defensible than aesthetic realism. I discussed five broad ways in which this
view might be supported, and I argued that none of these are successful.
This is not a knockdown refutation; at best the arguments here play the
role of undercutting defeaters: showing that the asymmetry claim is un-
motivated. But at the very least it places the burden of proof squarely on
the side of those who are sympathetic to the asymmetry claim. Unless some
arguments are given for the asymmetry claim, we should conclude that
aesthetic realism should be put on the map of serious philosophical posi-
tions worth engaging with, or that moral realism is less worthy of being
taken seriously than is currently supposed.
If what I’ve argued here is correct, wemight wonder why people have
found the asymmetry claim so appealing. If I’m right, its appeal outstrips
its argumentative support, so we might wonder if there are other factors
that have contributed to its attraction. One such factor might be the ap-
peal of another thesis fromwhich the asymmetry claim is not often clearly
distinguished. It is amuch-repeatedplatitude that there is a sense inwhich
the stakes are higher in ethics than aesthetics. While this claim would need
somefleshing out, there is no doubt something right about it. The thought
that, in some sense, itmattersmore to get things rightmorally than aesthet-
ically is a sensible one. But, of course, this has no bearing on the viability of
realism in the two domains. Getting things right morally matters more—in
pretty much any sense of mattering worth considering—than getting right
how many paper clips are in the drawer of my desk. And yet we don’t take
realism about the latter to be less tenable than realism about the former: on
the contrary, realism about the number of paper clips in my desk is largely
taken to be more defensible than moral realism. Nonetheless, it strikes me
as broadly right that the intuitive plausibility of the claim that the stakes are
in some sense higher with ethics than aesthetics goes some way to explain-
ing the widespread acceptance of the asymmetry claim.
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